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Abstract—This paper investigates interaction among res-
idential electricity users and utility company in a distribu-
tion network with the capability of two-way communication
provided by smart grid. The energy consumption schedul-
ing of electricity users is formulated as a game-theoretic
problem within a group where all players are not totally
selfish. Considering altruistic behavior of human decision-
making, altruistic player action to other players actions can
be influenced by recognizing the well being of others. The
proposed model captures the empathy of electricity users
in energy consumption scheduling and how this behavior
affect peak demand and electricity prices. Numerical results
demonstrate that both residential users and utility company
can benefit through the channel of empathy.
Index Terms—Demand response, game theory, altruism,
smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand Side Management (DSM) commonly refers
to programs implemented by utility companies to control
the energy consumption at the customer side of the meter.
These programs help to utilize available facilities more
efficiently without need for upgrading and installing new
generation and transmission infrastructure. The power
system usually face generation shortage in peak hours,
which necessitates to shed part of consumers demand
in order to maintain balance between generation and
demand which is the key factor in network security. This
problem is more challenging nowadays as power systems
face more uncertainties and risks due to high penetration
of renewable resources and more fluctuated consumption
patterns with the introduction of Plug-in Electric Vehi-
cles (PEVs). The active participation of consumers in
Demand Response (DR) programs, which is triggered
by incentive signals, is on of the best solutions to deal
effectively with this problem [1].
Game theory as the study of conflicts and cooperation
among intelligent rational decision-makers is one of the
most useful tools for modeling the behavior of consumers
in response to electricity prices. The performed studies
in this field are mainly emphasized on modeling the
interactions among a group of consumers in an area
which is supplied by a single utility/multiple utilities.
In such environment, each user tries to purchase larger
amount of power at lower prices to achieve higher
welfare and the goal of utility company is to achieve
higher welfare by setting higher electricity prices. In
such environment, it is assumed that enough generation
resources are available in the grid to supply demand of
the users while from the realistic perspective, sometimes
the power grid faces lack of generation capacity because
of technical and non-technical reasons.
Here, we want to introduce a new approach for model-
ing the complicated interactions between electricity users
in a grid with limited generation resources. Through the
channel of empathy, users may be concerned with their
usage effect on other users. According to the performed
studies in economics and behavioral psychology, individ-
uals show some degree of empathy towards other popu-
lation members [2]–[5]. In other words, individuals try to
imagine themselves in others shoes and consider social
preferences which results in more cooperation among
population. In this paradigm, the overall utility function
of each player is a combination of their own utility
function and other individuals utility function, which
means that well-being of others directly affects well-
being of altruistic individuals. In [6], [7], it was shown
that taking protective measures by infected individuals
could have a significant effect on disease control.
Electricity as a public good can be investigated in this
context. An altruistic consumer cares about the welfare of
others and decrease or shift his demand correspondingly
if he knows that generation resources in the grid are not
adequate. The idea is that residential users do not care
much to fulfill their demand within a specific time period
and have more flexible consumption pattern. It is worth
mentioning that all players are not altruistic and some of
them might be selfish which only focus on their payoffs.
Considering the presence of selfish users, we investigate
the impact of empathy on energy saving and electricity
prices and determine how the energy consumption of
selfish users changes when the network is populated with
altruistic users.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
An overview of related works in game-theoretic DR
is given in Section II. In Section III, we formulate
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2the energy scheduling among a group of residential
users with selfish and altruistic behaviors and propose a
distributed algorithm for solving the problem. Numerical
results are provided in Section IV and conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
By the introduction of smart grid, the access to
potential capabilities of DR programs becomes much
more viable because of two-way exchange of information
between users and utility company. In such environment,
the utility and users can interact by exchange of supply
and demand information in order to make mutually ben-
eficial decisions [8]. Different approaches have been em-
ployed to study demand response in smart gird paradigm
and game theory is one of the most promising approaches
due to the dynamic nature of interactive decision-making
between users and utility. In the following, we explore
several studies related to game-theoretic DR within three
different groups. However, first we introduce some terms
which are used frequently hereafter:
• Players denote decision makers of the game such
as electricity users and utility.
• Payoffs describe expected benefits that each player
obtains which could be maximizing revenue for
utility or minimizing billing cost for user.
• Actions are decisions made by each player like
scheduling energy consumption for user and setting
electricity prices for utility company.
A. Non-cooperative DR
Non-cooperative game is a type of game that predicts
individual payoffs among players that have conflicting
interests without any communication and cooperation [9].
In [10], a non-cooperative game was employed to model
interactions between consumers to decrease their billing
cost through energy consumption scheduling game. A
coupled-constraints energy consumption scheduling for
residential consumers was assessed in [11]. The authors
in [12] proposed a distributed control strategy with real
time pricing feedback to remove peak demand in a
noncooperative game formulation.
B. Cooperative DR
The cooperative game investigates coalition that may
form between players as a result of external enforce-
ment for cooperation and communication. In this type
of game, users decide to cooperate with each other
through communication to improve their payoffs. In fact,
the main challenge is how to incentivize users to get
together for cooperation or punish them to prevent non-
cooperative behavior. In [13], a punishment mechanism
was proposed to prevent selfish behaviors, which led
to Pareto-optimal solution. A repeated game along with
punishment mechanism detected by deviation from coop-
erative consumption were used to encourage cooperative
behavior among building managers [14]. Enforcing co-
operation behavior with Extended Joint Action Learning
method as decentralized reinforcement learning method
was studied in [15]. In this study, a joint reward function
was introduced with the aim of finding actions which
maximize this function within a multi agent system.
C. Stackelberg DR
The Stackelberg or leader-follower game models the
hierarchical interactions between players where the
leader moves first and the follower chooses his strategy
in response to that. Here, the leader would be the utility
company or aggregator which sets prices and the follower
is the end-user which determines load profile based on
electricity prices. In [16]–[21], Stackelberg game with
one leader and N-followers was employed to model
DR problem. More generalized form of this problem
is to have multiple utilities which compete each other
to maximize their payoff by setting electricity prices
and each user manages electricity portfolio by choosing
among them [22], [23].
In this paper, we model empathy in non-cooperative
DR within a group of residential users and single utility
company with limited generation resources and explore
how it affects electricity prices and total demand. By
employing dual decomposition method, we show that
the social maximization problem can be solved in a dis-
tributed manner without need for access to the generation
cost of utility company and payoff functions of users.
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The analytical description of the problem in a game
framework is explained in the rest. It is assumed that
there is a grid with multiple consumers and a single
utility company that supplies demand. The consumers are
communicating with each other and the utility company
via the capability provided by smart grid as shown in
Fig. 1.
A. Electricity Demand
The set of residential consumers is denoted by
R = {1, 2, . . . , R} and we assume that a day is di-
vided into T time slots shown by T = {1, 2, . . . , T}.
The daily demand for consumer r is denoted by
Dr = {xr,1, xr,2, . . . , xr,T } and it is clear that the total
hourly demand of users can be calculated by summation
across r. Here we assume that each user has a minimum
and maximum power consumption during each time slot:
xminr,t ≤ xr,t ≤ xmaxr,t , (1)
3Fig. 1. Interaction between consumers and utility company.
where the minimum value occurs for appliances which
must be kept on within a specific time and level such as
lighting and the maximum value shows highest possible
value of demand at each time slot for each user.
B. Utility Function
The utility function shows the level of satisfaction ob-
tained by each user as a function of energy consumption.
Generally, quadratic form is used to describe the behavior
of this function [24]:
U(x) =
{
wx− (α/2)x2, 0 ≤ x ≤ w/α
w2/(2α), x > w/α,
(2)
where x is the amount of energy consumption, w is
a positive parameter which varies for different users
and α is a constant. The utility function has two main
properties:
• It is an increasing function which is saturated as the
user reaches the desirable consumption level which
means that first order derivative is positive:
∂U(x)
∂x
> 0, 0 ≤ x < w/α. (3)
• It is a concave function which means that the
marginal benefit to the user is decreasing as con-
sumption increases:
∂2U(x)
∂x2
< 0, 0 ≤ x < w/α. (4)
We assume that the consumers can be classified into
two groups. The first group are selfish consumers where
only concerned about their utility function. From the
perspective of this group, other consumers are selfish as
well. On the other side, there is another group which
concern about the others and try to consider the commu-
nity preferences. For example, when the grid confronts
generation shortage, two solutions are possible to keep
the balance between load and generation. The first one
is to shed demand which means some users will be
disconnected. The second solution is that some users
decrease their demand in that critical period to help the
network operator and maybe themselves from getting
disconnected. Traditionally, it can be obtained by offering
monetary incentives for decrease in demand. However,
in this paper, it is assumed that some users consider
social welfare, motivated by different purposes such as
environmental concerns or desire for equity, in energy
consumption scheduling. This type of consumers called
altruistic consider part of other users energy consumption
as their own. In such situation, the altruistic consumers
evaluate the condition and behave in such a way to
prevent load shedding. We can model the behavior of
this group as below:
U˜(xr) = U
(
xr + ρr
[
xbaser −
∑
i∈R\{r} xi
|R| − 1
]+)
. (5)
where ρr is a coefficient that shows the level of empathy
for user r, xbaser is the baseline of energy consumption
for the user r obtained from historical profile, |R| is
the total number of users, and [.]+ is the projection
onto non-negative orthant. It should be noticed that the
altruistic user compares its baseline consumption with
the average of other participants, hereafter referred to as
x¯−r =
∑
i∈R\{r} xi
|R|−1 , and decides to decrease its demand
if uses more than global average. Clearly, the value of ρr
for selfish users is zero. The maximum value of utility
for a user with a non-zero empathetic parameter occurs
at a level less than x∗r = w/α, as the optimum value
obtained by (2). This can be verified by maximizing (5)
over x:
x∗r = arg max
xr
[
∂U˜(xr)
∂xr
= 0
]
=
{
w/α− ρr(xbaser − x¯−r), xbaser ≥ x¯−r
w/α, xbaser < x¯−r.
(6)
It is clear that losing part of demand costs users and
decrease their utility function. Due to the property of
utility function, social welfare is higher when a group of
people decrease part of their demand than the situation in
which a few number of users get disconnected from the
grid. To clarify this property, a sample utility function
for a typical residential consumer is shown in Fig. 2.
As it can be seen, the maximum utility happens at the
demand of 2 kW. We can consider a network consisting
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Fig. 2. Impact of empathy on utility function of a single user.
of 10 identical residential users which faces generation
shortage and can only supply 18 kW to the users. Since
all consumers want to maximize their utility, we need
20 kW to fulfill their demand. In such condition, two
different solutions are available to keep the balance
between supply and demand as a critical requirement in
maintaining power system stability [25]:
• The first alternative is that the system operator
disconnects one consumer from the grid. In such
condition, the total utility function of consumers
would be 9 units.
• The second alternative is that all of consumers
decrease their demand by 10% to compensate for
the shortage. This means they use 1.8 kW instead
of 2 kW. That causes the value of utility drops a
little from 1 to 0.99. The aggregated utility in this
situation is 10 × (0.99) units which is 10% higher
than the former case.
A higher aggregated utility is attained without discon-
necting any user from the grid by participation of users
in demand reduction. In a game like this one, users may
show altruism for getting benefits in long-term as the
consequence of spreading social awareness.
C. Cost Function
The cost function is the cost of utility company for
providing the electricity to end-users. In power systems,
this function is usually increasing and strictly convex:
∂C(l)
∂l
> 0,
∂2C(l)
∂l2
> 0. (7)
The most common form of cost function is quadratic
and is a function of total available energy provided by
the utility company [26]. In this term, at > 0, bt, ct ≥ 0,
and lt is total supplied demand and they can vary from
one hour to another:
C(lt) = atl
2
t + btlt + ct. (8)
A simpler and more practical form of cost function is
to assume that for each hour, the utility company sends
users the price for one unit of electricity consumption
to inform them about the electricity prices. We assume
that maximum available generation for each time slot is
bounded (lt ≤ lmaxt ) as a result of limitation in resources
or technical problems in the grid. The minimum available
generation capacity set lmint =
∑
r∈R xr,t to guarantee
minimum required energy for each time slot.
D. Objective Function
From the global perspective, the objective is to in-
crease the total utility of all the users in addition to
decrease the expense of supplying energy by the utility
company. In other words, the objective is to maximize
social welfare (sum of utility function of all users minus
the cost of supplying demand) by finding xr,t and lt in
the following equation:
maximize
∑
t∈T
(
∑
r∈R
U˜(xr,t)− C(lt))
subject to
∑
r∈R
xr,t ≤ lt, ∀t ∈ T
xminr,t ≤ xr,t ≤ xmaxr,t
lmint ≤ lt ≤ lmaxt ,
(9)
where U˜(xr,t) is defined in (5), lt is the available energy
in each hour which is limited in some critical time period
such as peak hours, and xminr,t , x
max
r,t denote constraints
on minimum and maximum energy consumption in each
hour for user r. It is clear that (9) is a convex function
and has a maximum.
We can solve (9) for each time slot separately since
this problem is not coupled in time. Therefore the
Lagrangian form of (9) for a single time slot t can be
written as below:
L(xt, lt, λt) =
∑
r∈R
U˜(xr,t)− C(lt) + λt(lt −
∑
r∈R
xr,t),
(10)
where xt = [x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xR,t] is the energy consump-
tion vector and λt is the Lagrangian multiplier at the
time slot t.
The challenge with solving (10) is that the utility com-
pany needs to know the utility function for each user to
find the optimum solution. However, the utility function
is private to the users. Therefore, instead of being able
to solve the global optimum, we can only solve for the
local optimum to each user. A good approach to solve
this problem is to use Lagrangian dual problem in order
to decouple the problem into separable sub-problems
and use duality theory to show that local and global
5optimum are identical when duality gap is zero [27].
The Lagrangian dual function is defined as the maximum
value of (10) over vector xt:
D(λt) = maximize
xminr,t ≤xr,t≤xmaxr,t
lmint ≤lt≤lmaxt
L(xt, lt, λt)
=
∑
r∈R
DSr,t(λt) +DPt (λt),
(11)
where
DSr,t(λt) = maximize
xminr,t ≤xr,t≤xmaxr,t
U˜(xr,t)− λtxr,t, (12)
and
DPt (λt) = maximize
lmint ≤lt≤lmaxt
λtlt − C(lt). (13)
The dual problem is:
minimize
λt
D(λt)
subject to λt ≥ 0.
(14)
The first term in (11) is dependent on users decisions
and the second term is determined based on utility
decision. Since the strong duality holds for a convex
with affine constraints problem, the primal problem in
(9) is equivalent to dual problem in (14), which means
the optimality gap is zero and hence the solution of dual
problem, x∗r,t and l
∗
t , is the optimum solution in the
primal problem [27].
The gradient projection method can be used to update
Lagrangian multipliers as long as the dual function
is differentiable [28]. The Lagrangian multiplier λ∗t is
calculated by the utility company in an iterative process
and can be interpreted as the coordination signal, which
is sent to the users for finding the optimum solution:
λk+1t = [λ
k
t − θ(l∗t −
∑
r∈R
x∗r,t(λ
k
t ))]
+, (15)
where θ is a small positive step-size and k denotes
the iteration. Here we use local optimizer in (12) for
each user to find x∗r,t(λ
k
t ) and solve the dual problem
iteratively.
The optimal value for each user depends on his con-
sumption and also on how other users schedule their con-
sumption. Here, it is assumed that each user announces
his demand and has access to the demand of other users
through the capability provided by smart grid [10]. It is
worth mentioning that the assumption for access to other
users consumption does not put the privacy of users at
risk since such data is required for meter reading and
billing purposes. For finding the optimum solution, we
need two levels of iterations. In the first level, the utility
find optimum generation capacity from (13) and based on
that and received consumption data from users, updates
Lagrangian multipliers for sending to users. In the lower
level, each user maximizes its payoff according to (12).
Then, each user sends back its energy consumption
value to the utility for updating generation capacity and
Lagrangian multipliers. This process will continue until
Lagrangian multiplier does not change. It is worth noting
that altruistic users need average consumption of other
users to decide whether or not weight it in their utility
function as additional data. Since, users payoff function
is strictly concave in terms of their own strategy set, it
is resulted directly from [29] that there is a unique Nash
Equilibrium which is obtained by finding the optimum
solution of the dual problem.
The distributed algorithm for finding the solution is
summarized below. It must be executed for each time
slot separately.
Algorithm 1 for finding optimal solution
1: Initialization
2: while Lagrangian multiplier changes do
3: for each iteration k do
4: Utility finds lt(λkt ) based on (13) and received
data from users
5: Utility updates λkt based on (15)
6: Utility sends λkt and x¯
∗
−r,t(λ
k
t ) to users (appli-
cable for altruistic users)
7: Each user computes the level of consumption
x∗r,t(λ
k
t ) from (12)
8: Each user broadcasts x∗r,t(λ
k
t ) to utility
9: Set k ← k + 1
10: end for
11: end while
12: return λk∗t and x∗r,t(λkt ) ∀r ∈ R
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the simulation results and performance
of the model are investigated. In this model, a grid is
composed of 10 residential consumers and a single utility
company. The scheduling cycle is divided into 24 equal
time slots in a typical day. The coefficients for the cost
function of supplying demand by the utility company are
at = 0.015, bt = 0.1, and ct = 0 for all t ∈ T . For the
utility function of the users, w is selected randomly from
[0.5, 1.5] and α is fixed at 0.5. For the level of empathy,
we assume that altruistic users show a level of altruism
towards others which are selected randomly from [0.5, 1].
The minimum and maximum generation capacity is set
to the summation of minimum and maximum required
energy by users for each time slot. Here, we consider
two cases: 1) all users are selfish and 2) half of users
are empathetic and the other half are selfish. Altruistic
consumers show empathy if the average consumption of
the population is less than their baseline consumption.
The total energy consumption patterns for the two
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Fig. 3. Aggregated energy consumption with/without empathy.
cases are shown in Fig. 3. According to the results, both
curves are within the permissible ranges, which is forced
by subjecting users to the Lagrangian multiplier as the
penalty cost of violating constraints. As it can be seen,
total energy consumption decreases especially in peak
hours as a result of altruistic behavior by some users.
In fact, total amount of energy consumption decreases
to 209.2 kWh from 220.7 kWh leading to a 5.2%
energy saving by the participation of altruistic users
in DR. Obviously, it can assist the utility company to
postpone the required investments for construction of
new generation capacity and upgrading the network in
the future.
Furthermore, by examining the simulation results, it
is determined that the contribution of altruistic users
decreases the electricity prices and consequently imposes
less costs on the utility company for supplying users
energy requirements. The hourly electricity prices curves
for both cases are illustrated in Fig. 4. As a result of the
linear relationship between marginal cost of electricity
and total demand, higher load reduction implies higher
decrease in electricity prices.
In order to observe the effect of empathy on energy
scheduling of selfish users, we plot the aggregated de-
mand of selfish users with and without altruistic users
in the grid. As shown in Fig. 5, the energy consumption
of selfish users almost remains the same with a total
increase of 0.5 kWh during the time horizon, which
is negligible comparing to 11.5 kWh energy saving. In
other words, selfish users could not make full use of
energy saving by altruistic users.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new game-theoretic approach toward
demand response by considering the altruistic behavior
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Hour
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
 P
ric
e 
($/
kW
h)
Case 2- 50% selfish
Case 1- 100% selfish
Fig. 4. Electricity prices with/without empathy.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Hour
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
To
ta
l L
oa
d 
(kW
)
Case 2- 50% selfish
Case 1- 100% selfish
Fig. 5. Aggregated energy consumption of same selfish users
with/without empathy.
of residential users is examined. The dual decompo-
sition method is employed to decompose the global
problem into solvable local sub-problems which can be
implemented in a decentralized manner. The simulation
results show that both users and the utility company
can benefit from this behavior by reduction in peak
demand and electricity prices. The extension to this work
can be studied by proposing a framework to motivate
empathetic users for maintaining their altruistic behavior
and spreading it to selfish users.
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